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cause SunOlin had taken business
away from South Jersey, a regulated utility, and not because of the
character and extent of SunOlin's
sales. The court found sufficient
evidence in the record from which
to conclude that SunOlin's actions
warranted regulation. The court
noted that in making this determination, the BPU was obligated to
consider SunOlin's sales potential
and marketing efforts in determining the "character and effect" of
SunOlin's business. SunOlin had a
supply of MRF equivalent to twothirds of South Jersey's industrial
volume. In addition, SunOlin
could interconnect its pipelines to
pose a substantial threat to South
Jersey's industrial service area. In
fact, SunOlin had solicited business from numerous South Jersey
industrial users. The court held
that the BPU properly concluded
that SunOlin posed a substantial
threat to South Jersey's industrial
market and therefore SunOlin was
a public utility within the BPU's
jurisdiction.
Suzi Guemmer

The North Carolina
Motor Vehicle Safety
and Financial
Responsibility Act
Allows an Insured Party
to Aggregate Separate
Underinsured Motorist
Insurance Coverages
In a case of first impression, the
North Carolina Supreme Court
held that by statute, a motorist who
purchases underinsured motorist
coverage for more than one vehicle, whether in one policy or in
several policies, may combine all
the coverages when making a claim
on any one of the vehicles. Sutton v
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 325 N.C.
259, 382 S.E.2d 759 (1989). The
court held that insured parties
could do so even if their insurance
policies specifically prohibit aggregating coverages because such prohibitions conflict with North Carolina statutory law.
Volume 2, Number 2/Winter, 1990

Background
Over the past several years, underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage has become a common type
of insurance protection. UIM coverage compensates the insured
party for expenses in excess of the
tortfeasor's insurance coverage. In
this way, UIM coverage protects
the innocent victims of financially
irresponsible motorists.
In 1985, North Carolina
amended section 20-279.21(b)(4)
of its Motor Vehicle Safety and
Financial Responsibility Act, N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 20-279.1 to .39 (1988)
("the Act"), to address situations
where owners purchase more than
one UIM coverage, whether within
a single policy or in several different policies. The amendment provided that in these multiple-coverage situations, the maximum protection would be "the total limits
of the owner's underinsured motorist coverages provided in the
owner's policies of insurance."
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21 (b)(4).
The legislature stated that it added
this section to give the owner of
UIM coverage the benefits of each
coverage he or she purchased.
Facts
Sherry S. Sutton ("Sutton") purchased two auto insurance policies
from Aetna Casualty & Insurance
Company ("Aetna"). The first policy contained two separate coverages, one for a Buick and the other
for a Chevrolet. Each coverage
included $50,000 basic bodily injury coverage as well as $50,000
per person UIM coverage. The
second policy covered two additional autos, a Plymouth and a
Chevrolet pickup truck. The second policy differed from the first
policy in that both its basic bodily
injury coverages and its UIM coverages had a $100,000 per person
maximum for each auto. Aetna
charged separate premiums for the
UIM coverage on each of Sutton's
four vehicles. Both policies contained the following provision:
The limit of bodily injury
liability.., for "each person",
for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of
liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one

person in any one auto accident... This is the most we will
pay for bodily injury and property damage regardless of the
number of.

.

. [v]ehicles or

premiums shown in the [policy] ....
On May 31, 1986, Sutton was
driving one of her insured autos
when a vehicle driven by Anthony
A. Genesio ("Genesio") crashed
into her car. Genesio died in the
accident and Sutton was injured.
Sutton sued Genesio's estate for
the injuries she suffered in the
accident.
Genesio carried liability insurance of $50,000, the entirety of
which his insurance company deposited with the court for Sutton's
benefit. However, Sutton claimed
in excess $70,000 in medical expenses plus a substantial loss of
future income due to her inability
to return to work. Consequently,
she notified Aetna that she expected her UIM coverages to provide the difference between Genesio's $50,000 insurance coverage
and the amount of her eventual
judgment. Citing the policy provisions, Aetna informed Sutton that
it would only provide $50,000 in
UIM coverage, which was the
amount she purchased for the car
that was hit. Sutton sued Aetna in
the North Carolina Superior Court
of Hanover County seeking a declaration that she was entitled to
aggregate all four of her UIM coverages in her two policies.
Superior Court of Hanover County
Aetna maintained that the terms
of the policy controlled the dispute. The policy explicitly stated
that Aetna's liability was limited to
the amount of the single coverage
for the auto which Sutton was
driving when she was hit. Thus,
Aetna argued that Sutton could
only claim UIM coverage in the
amount of $50,000.
Sutton argued that the Act overrode the terms of the policies. She
argued that the Act allowed her to
aggregate her coverages in both
policies and thereby claim a total
UIM coverage of $300,000: $50,000 each for the two autos in her
first policy and $100,000 each for
the two autos in her second policy.
(continued on page 58)
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Underinsured Motorist Insurance
The trial court entered judgment
for Aetna. The court stated that the
terms of the insurance policy governed the amount Sutton could
recover. The court rejected Sutton's argument that the Act overrode the terms of the insurance
policies. Sutton appealed and the
North Carolina Supreme Court
agreed to hear her case.
The North Carolina Supreme
Court
The North Carolina Supreme
Court first considered whether the
Act obligated an insurer to aggregate separate UIM coverages contained within a single car insurance
policy, despite policy language to
the contrary.
The court concluded that the
Act required aggregating UIM coverages. Although Sutton's policies
explicitly forbade aggregating UIM
coverage, the court cited the established North Carolina principle
that "if the terms of the policy
conflict with the statute, the provisions of the statute will prevail."
Sutton, 382 S.E.2d at 762.
Turning to the more difficult
issue of whether the Act permitted
aggregating coverages in separate
policies for separate vehicles, the
court noted that this was an issue
of first impression in North Carolina. In interpreting the Act, the
court looked to the legislature's
intent, as ascertained from the
statute's purpose, language, and
the consequences of various interpretations.
The court stated that the purpose of the Act was to compensate
innocent victims of tortfeasor's
with insufficient insurance. The
court stated that it would construe
the remedial statute liberally to
ensure that insured parties receive
the benefits intended by the legislature.
The court next examined the
Act's language. Specifically, the
court looked to see whether the Act
permitted either intrapolicy or
interpolicy aggregating. Intrapolicy
aggregating combines different
UIM coverages within a single pol58

(from page 57)

icy. Interpolicy aggregating combines UIM coverages in different
policies.
The Act states that insured parties may claim UIM coverage in
the amount of all UIM "coverages
provided in [the insured's] policies
of insurance." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20279.21(b)(4)(emphasis added). Because "coverages" was written in
the plural, the court concluded that
the Act allowed intrapolicy aggregating. Similarly, because "policies" was written in the plural, the
court found that the Act permitted
interpolicy stacking.
Aetna argued that another
phrase in the Act prohibited aggregating intrapolicy coverages. The
Act provided that it would operate
"in instances where more than one
policy may apply." Id. (emphasis
added). Although this phrase
seemed to permit only interpolicy
aggregating, the court reasoned
otherwise.
The court noted that according
to the last phrase of the Act, aggregation only applied to "nonfleet
vehicle insurance." This indicated
that the legislature intended the
Act to allow intrapolicy as well as
interpolicy aggregation. "Fleet"
vehicle insurance is a single insurance policy designed to cover the
numerous and changing vehicles of
a large business. By excluding owners of fleet insurance policies from
the benefits of intrapolicy stacking,
the Act prevented those owners
from reaping huge unbargained-for
coverage from the purchase of a
single policy. That the legislature
felt required to prohibit that sort of
intrapolicy aggregating (that is, intrapolicy aggregating within a single fleet policy) indicated that the
legislature intended to permit
other types of intrapolicy aggregating.
The court noted that its interpretation of the Act was consistent
with the Act's purpose. The interpretation enhanced the victim's
ability to recover for all of his or
her injuries. The interpretation
also reflected the separate premiums the insured paid for each

UIM coverage within a policy.
Furthermore, the interpretation
was consistent with prior North
Carolina court holdings which allowed intrapolicy stacking of medical coverage and uninsured motorist coverage.
Aetna argued that even if section
20-279.21(g) of the Act permitted
intrapolicy and interpolicy aggregating, the section only applied to
the extent necessary to meet the
statutorily required minimum coverage. To the extent that aggregating Sutton's UIM coverage exceeded statutory minimum, the
coverage was governed by the policy. The court rejected this argument.
The Act established minimum
limits of liability coverage. Section
20-279.21(b)(4) of the Act provided that liability policies which
exceed the statutory minimum
must include UIM coverage equal
to the amount of liability coverage.
The court reasoned that because
the UIM coverage must always
exceed the statutory minimum for
liability coverage, there could
never be "excess" UIM coverage.
Therefore, the Act governed regardless of the amount of UIM
coverage.
Finally, Aetna claimed that because the Act technically did not
required that Sutton accept UIM
coverage, such coverage cannot be
governed by the Act. The court
rejected this contention, noting
that if Aetna's argument were accepted, section 20-279.21(b)(4) of
the Act would be rendered useless
and redundant. No consumer had
to accept UIM coverage. If the Act
did not apply where the consumer
did not have to accept UIM coverage, all UIM coverage would be
governed by the insurance policies
and none by the Act.
The court reversed the trial
court's decision and remanded the
case to the trial court with instructions to allow Sutton to aggregate
her four coverages, giving her
$300,000 in available UIM insurance coverage.
Mark G. Sheridan
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